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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant Mekail Omar Jones appeals his sentence of 
120 months imprisonment following his guilty plea to 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Jones makes 
three claims of error by the District Court.  First, he argues 
that his prior conviction for vehicular flight should not have 
counted as a crime of violence under the sentencing 
guidelines.  Second, Jones contends that his conduct in this 
case did not support a guideline enhancement for assault on a 
police officer.  Third, he states that the District Court erred by 
presuming his guidelines range to be reasonable, ignoring 
arguments made by his defense counsel.   
 
 For the reasons that follow we will affirm in part, and 
reverse in part, the District Court’s judgment of sentence. 
 
I.  
 On the afternoon of April 27, 2011, uniformed City of 
Erie police officers Ryan Onderko and Gregory Baney 
responded to a disturbance call at a bar located at Parade and 
11th Streets in Erie, Pennsylvania.  As the officers 
approached the bar in their marked police cruiser, they 
spotted an individual, later identified as Jones, running from 
the bar.   
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 Officer Onderko was familiar with Jones from a prior 
arrest, as described below, and both officers were aware that 
Jones had an outstanding arrest warrant.  As the police cruiser 
approached, Jones stopped running and began walking, and 
Officer Onderko was then able to recognize him.  Officer 
Onderko exited the car and said, “hey, Jones, come here.”  
(App. 258.)  Jones then “took off running” toward 12th Street 
and Officer Onderko pursued him on foot, “yelling several 
times, ‘stop you’re under arrest.’”  (Id.)  The foot-chase that 
ensued saw Jones lead Officer Onderko across traffic on 12th 
Street before heading back in the direction where the chase 
began.   
 
 As Officer Onderko closed in, he could tell that Jones 
was reaching or digging in his waistband, but could not 
discern what Jones was reaching for.  (App. 259.)   Officer 
Baney parked the police cruiser, exited and began to pursue 
Jones as well.  As Jones fled back towards the parking lot 
where the chase had begun, Officer Baney observed Jones 
retrieve a handgun from his waistband while he was “no more 
than . . . two parking spots” away.  (App. 218.)  Officer 
Onderko then caught up to Jones and tackled him from 
behind.  At that moment, Officer Baney shouted, “Gun!” and 
the handgun flew out of Jones’s hand.  (App. 219.)  In 
tackling Jones, Officer Onderko suffered a complete tear of 
his anterior cruciate ligament.  Yet Jones managed to escape 
and continue fleeing.  Officer Baney grabbed Jones’s shirt, 
but Jones slipped out of his shirt and again continued to run.   
Officer Baney then shot Jones with his taser from a distance 
of 30-40 feet three times, finally subduing Jones.  
  
 Police later recovered the firearm that Jones had 
removed from his waistband, a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber 
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handgun.  In a post-arrest statement, Jones, a convicted felon, 
admitted that he was carrying the gun.  Jones was 
subsequently charged with, and pleaded guilty to, one count 
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
 
 The Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated Jones’s 
base offense level to be 24, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§2K2.1(a)(2), because Jones had previously been convicted of 
two “crimes of violence”: conspiracy to commit robbery, and 
fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement.  Jones 
objected, arguing that fleeing or attempting to elude was not a 
crime of violence.  (App. 47.)    
 
 This prior conviction was for a second degree 
misdemeanor charge of  “Fleeing or Attempting to Elude [a] 
Police Officer” under Pennsylvania law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3733.  The relevant language of the statute is as follows:  
 
Offense defined.--Any driver of a 
motor vehicle who willfully fails 
or refuses to  bring his vehicle to 
a stop, or who otherwise flees or 
attempts to elude a pursuing 
police officer, when given a visual 
and audible signal to bring the 
vehicle to a  stop, commits an 
offense as graded in subsection 
(a.2). 
 
The “grading” provision makes this offense a misdemeanor of 
the second degree, unless, while “fleeing or attempting to 
elude a police officer,” the driver (1) drives under the 
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influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, or (2) crosses a 
state line, or (3) “endangers a law enforcement officer or 
member of the general public due to the driver engaging in a 
high-speed chase.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733(a.2)(i)-(iii).  In 
that event, the offense is a third-degree felony. 
 
 The District Court first took note of several cases 
which had held that vehicular flight is categorically a crime of 
violence, as well as a non-precedential opinion of our Court 
in which we held that a conviction for vehicular flight under 
Pennsylvania law constituted a crime of violence.  (App. 298-
300) (citing United States v. Jackson, 495 F. App’x 224 (3d 
Cir. 2012).    
 
 However, the District Court did not resolve whether 
misdemeanor vehicular flight pursuant to 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3733(a)(1) categorically constitutes a crime of violence under 
the sentencing guidelines.  Instead, the District Court looked 
at the records of Jones’s conviction and concluded, “the 
factual conduct attributed to the defendant in the criminal 
information . . . and agreed to by the defendant during his 
colloquy is consistent with that attributed to the defendant in 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Jackson and would support an 
application of the enhancement pursuant to a modified 
categorical approach.” (App. 301.)  The District Court then 
recounted that “during the [plea] colloquy, the defendant 
admitted to backing his vehicle into Officer Onderko’s 
attended vehicle, engaging in a high speed chase, and failing 
to stop for multiple stoplights and stop signs.  In addition, he 
admitted to striking a fence and driving onto a lawn.”  (App. 
10-11.)  Thus, the District Court concluded that Jones’s prior 
conviction for fleeing and eluding was a crime of violence 
and overruled his objection. 
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 The Government also objected to the PSR, urging that 
an additional six-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3A1.2(c)(1) was warranted, because Jones assaulted Officer 
Onderko during the foot-chase.  Jones objected to this 
enhancement.  The District Court sustained the Government’s 
objection, concluding that reaching for a loaded gun is 
enough to produce a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, 
thereby warranting the six-level enhancement.   
 
 Toward the conclusion of sentencing, the District 
Court addressed defense counsel’s request for a variance, 
inquiring as to the factors that would support a sentence 
below the guidelines range.  The Court also engaged in a 
colloquy with defense counsel concerning his argument that it 
did not promote respect for the law to enhance Jones’s 
sentence to the statutory maximum based on uncharged 
conduct.   
 
 In calculating the final guidelines range, pursuant to § 
2K2.1(a)(2), the District Court utilized the base offense level 
of 24 based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence.  
The Court then added four levels for an enhancement under § 
2K2.1(b)(6)(B), not at issue here, for the possession of a 
firearm in connection with resisting arrest.  Subtracting three 
levels for acceptance of responsibility, the offense level stood 
at 25 with a criminal history category III, corresponding to an 
imprisonment range of 70 to 87 months.  Then, the 
subsequent addition of six levels for “assault” on Officer 
Onderko pursuant to § 3A1.2(c)(1) led to a new total offense 
level of 31, for an imprisonment range of 135 to 168 months.  
However, the statutory maximum time of imprisonment was 
ten years, so that pursuant to § 5G1.1(c), 120 months became 
Jones’s guidelines range.  The District Court accordingly 
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sentenced Jones to 120 months’ imprisonment.  In so doing, 
the District Court declined to grant a downward variance. 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
 
 Determination of what constitutes a crime of violence 
under the sentencing guidelines, and legal interpretations of 
the guidelines, are both subject to plenary review.  United 
States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1996).  Factual 
findings pertaining to sentencing are reviewed for clear error, 
and we review application of the guidelines to the facts for 
abuse of discretion.  Id.; United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 
113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review procedural error for 
abuse of discretion, but if an appellant fails to raise a 
contemporaneous objection below, we will review for plain 
error.  United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
 
 As noted above, Jones raises three separate claims of 
error concerning his sentence: (1) that the District Court erred 
in determining that his vehicular flight conviction constituted 
a crime of violence under the guidelines, (2) that the District 
Court erred in imposing a six-level enhancement for 
assaulting the police, and (3) that the District Court 
improperly presumed the applicable sentencing guidelines to 
be reasonable, while ignoring defense counsel’s arguments.  
We address each of these claims in turn. 
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1. Vehicular Flight - Crime of Violence 
 Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) a defendant’s base 
offense level is 24 if the instant offense was committed after 
at least two felony convictions involving a “crime of 
violence.”  A crime of violence is defined in § 4B1.2(a)(1)-
(2) as : 
 
any offense under federal or state 
law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, 
that-- (1) has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the 
person of another, or (2) is 
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to 
another. 
 
(emphasis added).  Because the Pennsylvania crime defined 
above does not have as an element the use of physical force, 
and is not listed as an enumerated offense, the issue in this 
case is whether Jones’s conviction for misdemeanor vehicular 
flight qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the final, 
residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2).  
 
 In making this determination, courts are required to 
follow the “categorical approach,” wherein the crime of 
conviction is evaluated as to whether it categorically 
constitutes a crime of violence.  “That is, we consider 
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whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would 
justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without 
inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.”  
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (emphasis 
in original).1
 
  Thus, in the ordinary case involving the residual 
clause, the categorical approach calls for a straightforward 
procedure: determining whether the elements of the statute of 
conviction categorically “involve[] conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  See 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2); see also Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2267 (2011) (applying the categorical approach to determine 
if vehicular flight constitutes a crime of violence under the 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”)). 
 The Supreme Court has recently spoken as to when we 
can look beyond the fact of conviction and examine certain 
record evidence, in determining whether the conviction 
constitutes a crime of violence.  In Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the Court held that only where 
the conviction involves a divisible statute, containing multiple 
alternate elements, where it may be impossible to conclude 
which statutory provision was the basis for the conviction, is 
                                              
1 James concerned the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1), which mandates a 
minimum of fifteen years imprisonment if a defendant has 
three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” 550 U.S. at 195.  
However, “the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA 
is sufficiently similar to the definition of a crime of violence 
under the Sentencing Guidelines that authority interpreting 
one is generally applied to the other . . . .”  United States v. 
Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted). 
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the sentencing court permitted to investigate the record 
beyond the fact of conviction.  Pursuant to this “modified 
categorical approach,” a court may consult extra-statutory 
documents such as the “charging document, written plea 
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit 
factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).  
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Descamps:  
 
the modified approach merely 
helps implement the cat egorical 
approach when a  defendant 
was convicted of violating a 
divisible statute.  The modified 
approach  thus acts not as an 
exception, but instead as a tool.  It 
retains the categorical approach’s 
central feature: a focus on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of 
a crime. . . . All the modified 
approach adds is a mechanism for 
making that comparison when a 
statute lists multiple, alternative 
elements, and so effectively 
creates “several different . . . 
crimes.” 
 
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 
557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). 
 
 Thus, only if the Pennsylvania statute effectively 
creates several different crimes, such that it, “renders opaque 
which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction,” 
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should the court resort to the modified categorical approach.  
Id. at 2283.  This approach should be followed if certain 
elements of the statute fit within the definition of a crime of 
violence, while other alternative elements do not.  In that 
event, the court would need to know which elements were the 
basis for the defendant’s conviction, and the court may 
examine Shepard documents to make that determination.  See 
id. 2285 (“If at least one, but not all of those crimes [in a 
given statute] matches the generic version, a court needs a 
way to find out which the defendant was convicted of.”)   
 
 While it could be argued that the Pennsylvania statute 
in question is a divisible one, given the clauses separated by 
“or,” Jones’s conviction does not require further examination 
under the modified categorical approach.  That is because it 
matters little whether Jones intentionally “fail[ed] or refus[ed] 
to bring his vehicle to a stop,” or  “otherwise fle[d] or 
attempt[ed] to elude” law enforcement, after being ordered to 
stop.  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733(a).  All of the listed conduct 
involves the same type of intentional disobedience of a 
command from law enforcement while in a vehicle.  As such, 
all of the listed conduct is of the same nature, that either 
would or would not collectively fit under the definition of a 
crime of violence.  Thus, for purposes of our analysis, the 
statute creates one crime of willfully fleeing from law 
enforcement, and we need not resort to the modified 
approach. 
 
 While it may be tempting to examine the conduct 
underlying a given conviction, as the District Court did, the 
Supreme Court now says we cannot.  Indeed, until only 
recently we sometimes employed the modified categorical 
approach in a way that may have implied its use was not so 
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limited.  See United States v. Marrero, 677 F.3d 155, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (examining underlying conduct without 
determining threshold question of whether the statute is 
divisible such that some combinations of elements would be a 
crime of violence and some would not), judgment vacated, 
133 S. Ct. 2732 (2013).  However, we are bound by the 
holding of Descamps, which makes clear that use of the 
modified categorical approach is restricted to determining the 
crime of conviction from divisible statutes, in which certain 
proscribed conduct fits within the definition of a crime of 
violence, and other conduct does not.  
 
 Under Descamps, the District Court erred, although 
perhaps understandably given some of our prior case law, by 
engaging in a factual analysis in determining whether Jones’s 
conviction was a crime of violence.  The Court recounted that 
“during the [plea] colloquy, the defendant admitted to 
backing his vehicle into Officer Onderko’s attended vehicle, 
engaging in a high speed chase, and failing to stop for 
multiple stoplights and stop signs.  In addition, he admitted to 
striking a fence and driving onto a lawn.”  (App. 10-11.)  The 
Court accordingly concluded that the “defendant’s prior 
conviction of fleeing and attempting to elude police is a crime 
of violence . . . .” (App. 11.)   As courts may only utilize the 
modified categorical approach where the court needs to 
determine the statutory basis for the defendant’s conviction, 
we now view this factual inquiry as improper. 
 
 The Government contends that the Court did not err 
because it did not utilize the modified approach, or because 
the factual analysis constituted an alternative holding.  Both 
arguments are meritless.  First, the District Court specifically 
stated that it could apply the enhancement “pursuant to a 
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modified categorical approach,” before proceeding to cite the 
conduct of the defendant during the car chase.  (App. 10.)  
Second, although the District Court noted that “various 
Circuit Courts which have considered the question have 
determined that vehicular flight categorically involves a 
potential risk of serious injury,” the District Court did not rely 
on such authority to reach a similar conclusion. (App. 7.)  
Rather, the District Court relied on the “factual conduct 
attributed to the defendant in the criminal information and 
agreed to by the defendant during his colloquy,” to conclude 
that Jones had committed a crime of violence under the 
guidelines.  (App. 10.)  As an improper use of the modified 
categorical approach, this was error, and would normally 
require us to remand for resentencing on this basis.2
 
 
 However, the District Court’s error may be harmless if 
Jones’s misdemeanor flight conviction nonetheless qualifies 
categorically as a crime of violence.  See United States v. 
Taylor, 630 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding improper 
use of modified categorical approach harmless where the 
“district court reached the correct conclusion” in determining 
a conviction to be a crime of violence).  The Supreme Court 
spoke to this issue in Sykes, 131 S. Ct. 2267, holding that an 
offense under the Indiana vehicular flight law was a violent 
felony under the residual clause of the ACCA.   The Indiana 
statute generally prohibited “knowingly or intentionally . . . 
                                              
2 Because we find the District Court erred in looking to the 
factual conduct underlying the flight conviction, we need not 
address Jones’s further argument that the District Court also 
erred by reciting facts alleged in separate counts of the state 
court information and stated in other counts of the plea 
colloquy. 
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flee[ing] from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, 
by visible or audible means, identified himself and ordered 
the person to stop.”  Id. at 2271 (quoting Ind. Code 35-44-3-
3(a)(3)).  The statute contained multiple distinct offenses, 
including: (1) engaging in flight while using a vehicle, and (2) 
engaging in flight while “operat[ing] a vehicle in a manner 
that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person.” Id. (quoting Ind. Code 35-44-3-3(b)(A)-(B)(1)).  
Both of these offenses were graded as “Class D” felonies 
under Indiana law.  Id. 
 
 In Sykes, the defendant argued that because he was 
convicted under the simple vehicular flight provision, and not 
the aggravated counterpart, his conviction necessarily did not 
involve a substantial risk of violence, and thus did not 
constitute a violent felony.  Id. at 2276.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, relying in part on the fact that both the 
simple and aggravated offenses were graded as Class D 
felonies, reflecting a legislative judgment that both types of 
violations significantly risked violence.  Id.  Jones urges here 
that, because in Sykes both crimes were felonies and his 
offense is only a misdemeanor, Sykes requires a finding in his 
favor. 
 
 Admittedly, the statute in this case sets forth both a 
misdemeanor and a felony.  It is a second-degree 
misdemeanor for a driver to “willfully fail[] or refuse[] to 
bring his vehicle to a stop, or . . . otherwise flee[] or attempt[] 
to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and 
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop . . . .” 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3733(a).  However, vehicular flight is a third-
degree felony if it also “endangers a law enforcement officer 
or member of the general public due to the driver engaging in 
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a high-speed chase . . . .” Id. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii).  Jones was 
initially charged with the third-degree felony provision, but 
later pled to a second-degree misdemeanor violation of the 
statute.  
 
 The Sykes Court took note of this precise situation, 
where “a crime is a lesser included offense . . . in cases where 
that offense carries a less severe penalty than the offense that 
includes it.”  131 S. Ct. at 2277.  However, the Court stated it 
was not deciding whether such a lesser-graded offense would 
also constitute a violent felony.  Id.  Thus, we are left without 
specific guidance as to whether the fact that Jones’s 
conviction was a misdemeanor matters in determining 
whether it is a crime of violence. 
 
 Even without such guidance, however, we reject the 
notion that the misdemeanor versus felony distinction is 
controlling here.  The language of the misdemeanor 
provision, as noted above, prohibits willfully fleeing from law 
enforcement in a vehicle.  The language of the Sykes court 
was unequivocal in describing the significant risks associated 
with intentional vehicular flight.  The Court explained that 
“[e]ven if the criminal attempting to elude capture drives 
without going at full speed or going the wrong way, he 
creates the possibility that police will, in a legitimate and 
lawful manner, exceed or almost match his speed or use force 
to bring him within their custody.  A perpetrator’s 
indifference to these collateral consequences has violent—
even lethal—potential for others.”  Id. at 2273.  In support, 
the Court cited numerous statistics showing the high rate of 
crashes and injuries which result from car chases with police, 
and the relatively lower risk of violence associated with 
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burglary and arson, which are enumerated in the ACCA as 
violent felonies.  Id. at 2274-75. 
 
 Our sister circuit courts who have addressed this 
situation have uniformly held that lesser, lower-graded flight 
offenses are violent felonies under the ACCA (or crimes of 
violence under the guidelines).  In response, Jones argues that 
the statutes in those cases contained narrow aggravated flight 
provisions, such that the lesser flight counterparts still 
encompassed substantially risky crimes.  For instance, Jones 
points out that in United States v. Doyle, 678 F.3d 429, 432 
(6th Cir. 2012), Tennessee’s aggravated flight law only 
applied where “the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of 
death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties,” 
such that the simple flight provision at issue still 
encompassed flights which posed a risk to pursuing police 
officers.  Further, in both United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 
263 (4th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 
1290 (11th Cir. 2013), the Courts of Appeals found Florida’s 
lesser-included flight statute to be a violent felony, noting that 
the aggravated flight provision criminalized only those flights 
involving high-speed chases, such that the lesser provision 
covered still-risky lower-speed chases.  By contrast, Jones 
urges that the Pennsylvania aggravated flight provision is 
very broad, encompassing risk to police officers, third parties, 
and lower-speed chases, so that misdemeanor flight under 
Pennsylvania law must relate to conduct that does not involve 
substantial risk, and thus cannot constitute a crime of violence 
under the sentencing guidelines.  
 
 While Jones’s characterization of these cases is 
accurate to a point, those courts were also guided, as we are, 
by the unambiguous language of Sykes concerning the danger 
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posed by vehicular flight.  For instance, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted that “[t]he Supreme Court could not have been clearer 
in concluding that vehicle flight from a law enforcement 
officer is an extraordinarily risky enterprise . . . .” Petite, 703 
F.3d at 1296-97.  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recognized that 
“intentional vehicular flight in any manner poses a potential 
level of risk that is sufficient to render the offense a violent 
felony.”  Hudson, 673 F.3d at 268 (emphasis in original); see 
also Doyle, 678 F.3d at 435 (finding that in vehicular flight, 
the “expected confrontation between suspect and police 
officer places property and persons at serious risk of injury.”)  
Thus, while these courts were properly concerned with the 
differentiation between the grades of offenses in the statutes 
at issue, they also were mindful of the profound risks which 
are part and parcel of intentional flight from the police, as 
detailed in Sykes.  
  
 And, the language of the Pennsylvania misdemeanor 
provision itself rebuts Jones’s contention that it would 
involve only non-dangerous conduct.  Indeed, it encompasses 
exactly the type of conduct Sykes considered, intentional 
flight.  The felony of aggravated flight, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3733(a)(2)(iii), encompasses flight which “endangers a law 
enforcement officer or member of the general public due to 
the driver engaging in a high-speed chase.”  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court opinion In re R.C.Y., relied upon 
by Jones, states that “the legislature included this term [high-
speed chase] to indicate that the enhanced penalties applied 
only in cases where the defendant’s actions created an 
extraordinary danger to the public at large or to police 
officers.”  27 A.3d 227, 230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).   Thus, 
while the felony provision is aimed at extraordinary danger, 
the misdemeanor provision nonetheless encompasses the 
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danger inherent in willful flight from, or eluding of, police 
after being signaled by police to stop.  This clearly fits within 
the definition of a crime of violence, as it “involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).   
 
 As Sykes explained, “[r]isk of violence is inherent to 
vehicle flight.  Between the confrontations that initiate and 
terminate the incident, the intervening pursuit creates high 
risks of crashes.  It presents more certain risk as a categorical 
matter than burglary.”  Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274.  “Unlike 
burglaries, vehicle flights from an officer by definitional 
necessity occur when police are present, are flights in 
defiance of their instructions, and are effected with a vehicle 
that can be used in a way to cause serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”  Id.; see also Commonwealth v. 
Ruffin, 16 A.3d 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (describing a 
misdemeanor flight conviction under § 3733  involving a 
flight from police, where the defendant put his car into 
reverse and caused a collision with a police vehicle).  
Accordingly, when intentional vehicular flight from law 
enforcement does not “create[] an extraordinary danger,” but 
nonetheless falls under Pennsylvania’s misdemeanor flight 
provision, we hold that such flight still categorically “presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 
constituting a crime of violence under the sentencing 
guidelines.  See In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230; U.S.S.G.            
§ 4B1.2(a)(2).3
                                              
3 Jones’s argument pertaining to United States v. Lewis, 330 
Fed. App’x 353 (3d Cir. 2009) does not alter our conclusion.  
“It is well established that we are not bound by our own non-
  We therefore conclude that the District 
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Court’s error in applying the modified categorical approach 
was harmless and we will affirm the District Court’s ruling 
that Jones’s misdemeanor flight conviction qualified as a 
crime of violence.    
 
2.  Enhancement for Assault on Official Victim 
 Jones next argues that the District Court erred by 
applying a six-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3A1.2(c)(1).  That provision permits an increase in sentence 
where, “in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious 
bodily injury, the defendant . . . having reasonable cause to 
believe that a person was a law enforcement officer, assaulted 
such officer during the course of the offense or immediate 
flight therefrom.”  Application Note 4 to that Guideline states 
in relevant part: “Subsection (c) applies in circumstances 
tantamount to aggravated assault (i) against a law 
enforcement officer, committed in the course of, or in 
immediate flight following, another offense . . . .”   
 
 The parties do not dispute that Jones reasonably 
understood that Officer Onderko and Baney were law 
enforcement officers as required by the first clause of § 
3A1.2(c)(1).  Rather, the issue on appeal concerns whether 
Jones actually assaulted a law enforcement officer pursuant to 
the enhancement.  Jones claims that “assault,” under                            
§ 3A1.2(c)(1), requires assaultive conduct whereby he caused 
an official victim to actually experience apprehension of 
immediate bodily injury.  Jones contends that the facts of this 
case fail to support any such finding.  The Government 
                                                                                                     
precedential opinions.”   Castillo v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 729 
F.3d 296, 310 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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responds that the act of producing a gun while running from 
law enforcement constitutes assault, because such an act 
could reasonably cause fear. 
 
 Section 3A1.2(c)(1) does not define assault, and its 
precise meaning is a matter of first impression in our Court.  
However, several of our sister circuit courts have attempted to 
parse the language of this enhancement.  For instance, in 
United States v. Lee, 199 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1999), a defendant 
physically struggled with officers in attempting to escape 
from a traffic stop, while repeatedly reaching for a loaded gun 
in his waistband.  Id. at 16-17.   In determining whether such 
conduct amounted to assault, the court in Lee held, and the 
parties agree, that assault under § 3A1.2(c)(1) should 
generally “be read as a reference to common law criminal 
assault.” 4
 
  Id. at 17.   
 Lee has been cited approvingly by several other circuit 
courts for the proposition that the definition of common law 
assault applies to § 3A1.2(c)(1), and we are aware of no court 
of appeals that has held to the contrary.  See United States v. 
Olson, 646 F.3d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We join those 
circuits that have concluded that the term ‘assault’ in the 
Official Victim enhancement is a reference to common-law 
criminal assault.”); United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 
660 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting with approval that “application of 
the common law meaning of ‘assault’ provides us with the 
                                              
4 At that time, the assault enhancement was designated § 
3A1.2(b).  Any differences in the wording of the current 
enhancement are immaterial.  For the sake of clarity, we refer 
to the enhancement under its current numbering, § 
3A1.2(c)(1), regardless of its designation in any opinion. 
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same result we reach by considering its common meaning”); 
United States v. Robinson, 537 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).  
In addition, we previously adopted the common-law 
definition of assault where that term was undefined in a 
federal statute.  See United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 
102 (3d Cir. 2001).  Thus, in interpreting § 3A1.2(c)(1), we 
hold in accord with our sister circuits that assault is defined 
according to its common-law definition. 
 Thus, we adopt the concept of assault as generally 
outlined in Lee:  
 
 Common law assault 
embraces two different crimes: 
one is attempted battery, that is, 
an intended effort to cause bodily 
harm to another which falls short 
of success . . . regardless of 
whether the intended victim 
knows of the attempt . . . The 
other branch of assault is an act 
which is intended to, and 
reasonably does, cause the victim 
to fear immediate bodily harm; 
such “menacing” constitutes 
assault even if  no physical harm 
is attempted, achieved, or 
intended. 
 
199 F.3d at 18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  In 
rendering its decision, the Lee court first held that attempted 
battery was inapplicable, as there had been no finding of 
intent on the part of the defendant to shoot at the police 
officers, “and it is not clear that the evidence would readily 
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lend itself to such a finding unless the judge discredited Lee’s 
own statement as to his intent.”  Id.  However, the court 
determined that the second type of assault, an act which 
would reasonably cause fear, reflected the defendant’s 
actions, as the defendant’s “efforts to free his gun did cause  
[the officer] to fear – quite reasonably so, in our view – and 
the district judge so found.” Id. at 20.5
 Just as the court in Lee, we can readily dispose of the 
first prong of assault, attempted battery.  The Government 
does not claim, and the District Court here made no finding, 
that Jones withdrew the gun with the intent to harm either 
Officer Onderko or Officer Baney.  The most that can be said 
is that the District Court granted a separate enhancement, not 
appealed here, under § 2K2.1(b)(6), which involves the use of 
a firearm in connection with another felony offense.  The 
Court granted the enhancement on the ground that the 
defendant “used or possessed the firearm at issue while 
resisting arrest.”  (App. 306.)  In connection with that ruling 
the Court stated, “I find it reasonable to infer from the 
circumstances surrounding his flight and efforts to resist 
arrest that he drew the firearm at that precise moment in order 
to further his efforts to escape.  At a minimum, drawing a 
firearm at that moment certainly had the potential to facilitate 
 
  
                                              
5 Significant for our analysis below, the facts of Lee indicate 
that the officers were aware of the threat that the defendant 
was reaching for a gun.  See, 199 F.3d at 17 (“[T]he officers 
screamed to each other that Lee was reaching for his waist 
and they sought to grab his hands.”) 
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his resisting arrest.” 6
 
  (App. 305.)  Such statements do not 
constitute a finding that Jones withdrew the gun with the 
intent to harm Officer Onderko or Baney, and the evidence 
does not support such a finding. Accordingly, attempted 
battery, which requires a finding that the defendant intended 
to harm another, is inapplicable here. 
 The second type of assault, dubbed “menacing” in Lee, 
presents a closer question.  Such assault requires that the 
defendant intends to and reasonably does cause fear.  The 
“intends to” element, for purposes of this provision, should be 
satisfied if the defendant has “ample reason to know that fear 
will be caused,” such that “the lack of purpose to cause fear 
should not matter.”  Lee, 199 F.3d at 19.  We will not dwell 
on the intent requirement as it is clearly satisfied in this case.  
But, the “reasonably does cause fear” aspect is more 
troubling.  Jones argues that he did not commit assault in part 
because he did not actually frighten Officer Onderko.  By 
contrast, the Government notes that Officer Baney saw Jones 
withdraw the handgun and that the gun had a profound impact 
on Officer Baney.   
 
 However, the Government argued below only that 
Jones assaulted Officer Onderko, and never claimed that 
                                              
6 Similarly, the District Court also overruled Jones’s objection 
which sought to modify the PSR to state that Jones 
intentionally threw the gun away when he was tackled by 
Officer Onderko.  However, the District Court made no 
affirmative finding as to Jones’s intent when he produced the 
gun.     
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Officer Baney was a victim of an assault.7
 
   The Government 
has therefore waived any claim on appeal that Officer Baney 
was assaulted during the foot-chase. 
 Accordingly, the sole question is whether Jones 
assaulted Officer Onderko by “menacing.” As noted above, 
Officer Onderko was pursuing Jones on foot from behind, and 
he could see that Jones was “digging, either in his pockets or 
in his waistband,” but Officer Onderko could not tell what 
Jones was reaching for.  (App. 262.)  When asked whether he 
would have done anything differently if he had known Jones 
had a gun, Officer Onderko responded, “I would not have 
tackled him.” (App. 264.)   That clearly indicates that Officer 
Onderko did not realize Jones had a gun and thus did not 
experience fear. 
 
                                              
7 See (Gov. Supp. Sentencing Mem., App. 104 (“Defendant 
resisted arrest and assaulted Officer Onderko.”); id. at App. 
105 (arguing that § 3A1.2(c)(1) “applies here, based on 
Defendant’s resisting arrest and assaultive conduct against 
Officer Onderko . . . .”); Sentencing Transcript, November 
28, 2012, App. 284 (Government attorney claiming, “his 
mens rea goes to his knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that Officer Onderko, whom he assaulted, was a law 
enforcement officer.”); id. at App. 202 (Defense attorney 
noting “the only one he’s alleged to have committed an 
aggravated assault on is Officer Onderko.”); Gov. Post-
Hearing Brief, App. 181 (“Thus, section 3A1.2 applies if the 
Defendant either assaulted Officer Onderko when Defendant 
drew his weapon, or if Defendant assaulted Officer Onderko 
thereafter, in his ‘immediate flight’ from the offense.”)).   
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  Officer Baney’s testimony noted the simultaneous 
nature of the events at issue.  As he stated at sentencing, “I 
saw the weapon being pulled, I yelled gun, and that is exactly 
when in a simultaneous action Officer Onderko tackled Mr. 
Jones.”  Officer Baney further agreed that at the “moment of 
impact” Jones’s arm went up and “the gun [went] flying.” 
(App. 219.) 
 
 Seeking to clarify the language of the criminal 
complaint drafted by Officer Baney, the Government further 
focused on the precise timing of the events at issue.  
Government counsel inquired, “[w]hat about the sense of 
timing that comes from that sentence, when you have the 
phrase throw a gun and was tackled.  Did you intend, are you 
expressing that those happened at separate points in time?”  
Officer Baney replied, “[n]o, I’m just expressing that it 
happened at that time.”  Government counsel further asked, 
“[y]our understanding of the event, was that it was a 
simultaneous gun flying in the air at the moment of tackle?”  
Officer Baney responded unequivocally, “[y]es.” (App. 227-
28).   
 
 Taken together, Officer Baney’s testimony establishes 
that he yelled “gun,” “exactly when in a simultaneous action 
Officer Onderko tackled Mr. Jones,” and that “it was a 
simultaneous gun flying in the air at the moment of tackle[.]”  
(App. 219, 227-28.)  Therefore, according to his own 
testimony, Officer Baney shouted “gun” at the same moment 
that the firearm flew out of Jones’s hand.   
 
 For his part, Officer Onderko never saw the gun in 
Jones’s hand, in the air, or even on the ground until Jones was 
finally apprehended. As Officer Onderko testified at 
27 
 
sentencing: “I did not see the gun until it was recovered.”  
(App. 269.)  Further, nothing in the record indicates that 
Officer Onderko suspected that Jones had a gun during the 
pursuit.8
 
  Finally, because Officer Baney yelled “gun” at the 
same moment that the gun flew out of Jones’s hand, Officer 
Onderko was not aware of the presence of a firearm until it 
was no longer in Jones’s possession.  The facts thus present a 
relatively unusual scenario, an alleged “menacing” assault 
where the victim was unaware of any menace until it had 
ceased. 
 A helpful framework for analyzing such an assault is 
found in one of the few cases presenting roughly similar facts, 
United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).  
In that case, the defendant threw a rock at federal Customs 
and Border Protection Officer.  As the Ninth Circuit 
recounted, “[t]he rock did not strike Officer Lopez, though it 
came within two feet of hitting his head.  Officer Lopez did 
not see [the defendant] throw the rock or observe it travel 
through the air.  In fact, Officer Lopez only became aware of 
the rock when he heard it hit the metal gate behind him . . . .” 
                                              
8 The following exchange took place at sentencing: 
 
Counsel for Government: And as you see him then reaching 
for something at his waistband, you don’t know what he’s 
grabbing for?   
 
Officer Onderko: No, I do not.   
 
Counsel for Government: Just digging around for something.   
 
Officer Onderko: That’s correct.  (App. 263.) 
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Id. at 1115.  The defendant was charged with assault on a 
federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b).  
Id.  
 
 Because “assault” was not defined in the federal 
statute, the Ninth Circuit adopted a common law definition 
similar to that utilized above for § 3A1.2(c)(1).  Id. at 1117.  
The Acosta-Sierra court further held that “a victim’s 
apprehension of immediate bodily injury must be determined 
by an objective standard of reasonableness . . . the evidence 
must permit an inference that a reasonable person ‘standing in 
the official’s shoes,’ that is, observing what the official 
observed, would have apprehended imminent bodily injury.”  
Id. at 1119-20.  This objective standard also aligns with the 
common-law test adopted for § 3A1.2(c)(1) in Lee: “an act 
which is intended to, and reasonably does, cause the victim to 
fear immediate bodily harm . . . .”  199 F.3d at 18. 
 
 Applying this standard, the court noted that “Officer 
Lopez did not see [the defendant] before he threw the rock 
and did not realize what had happened until after the threat of 
imminent bodily harm had passed.  A reasonable person 
observing what Officer Lopez observed, therefore, would not 
have been aware of any threat.”  Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d at 
1121.  Thus, the court held, “[b]ecause Officer Lopez did not 
become aware of the threat until after it had dissipated, a 
reasonable person in his position would not have apprehended 
immediate bodily injury.”  Id. at 1123.  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that assault, founded on reasonable apprehension 
of harm, did not apply to the defendant’s actions. 
 
 We similarly conclude that, given the consistent 
reporting of the events in the record, whereby Officer 
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Onderko did not see the gun, no assault occurred.9
 
  We need 
not decide whether, as Jones contends, an official must 
subjectively experience apprehension for § 3A1.2(c)(1) to 
apply.   This is because, at minimum, such fear must be 
objectively reasonable.  See Lee, 199 F.3d at 18; United 
States v. Olson, 646 F.3d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that fear of officers “was reasonable,” in applying assault 
enhancement); United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263, 1269 
(10th Cir. 2010) (“The evidence easily supports the district 
court’s finding that the gunshots placed the officers in 
reasonable apprehension of being shot.”)  That is, a court 
must find that a defendant’s actions would cause fear in a 
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the official victim.  
This reasonableness evaluation incorporates the observations 
actually made by the official, and does not permit a court to 
presume additional knowledge or sight. The record 
established that as Officer Onderko was unaware and did not 
suspect that Jones possessed a gun, a reasonable person in his 
position would not have experienced fear, and thus Jones did 
not commit an assault.  We therefore conclude that the 
Government failed to carry its burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that this enhancement should 
apply.  See United States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he government always bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts 
support a sentencing enhancement . . . .”)   
 Adopting the Government’s position would elevate 
any conduct that might cause fear to the level of assault, 
                                              
9 We also find that the issue of timing was exhaustively 
addressed at sentencing, and further evidentiary development 
on this point upon remand is not warranted. 
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regardless of whether any official victim felt, or would 
reasonably have felt, apprehension.  This standard would read 
the element of “assault” out of the guideline, instead 
enhancing sentences for any conduct that creates a risk of 
bodily harm, even though such acts are already addressed by 
other enhancements.  See e.g., U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2  (“Reckless 
Endangerment During Flight”).  We decline to render the 
critical requirement of assault a nullity. 
 
 The reasoning of the District Court in granting the 
enhancement does not alter our conclusion.  The District 
Court found that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that section 
3A1.2 official victim enhancement is properly applied in 
situations where a defendant who is fleeing or scuffling with 
police officers attempts to produce or utilize a firearm 
because ‘simply reaching for a loaded gun is enough to create 
a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person.’”  
(App. 17) (quoting United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 524 
(7th Cir. 2009)).  However, Easter concerned a different 
guideline enhancement, “Reckless Endangerment During 
Flight,” which applies, “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a 
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer 
. . . .” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Section 3A1.2(c)(1), the 
enhancement at issue here, requires not simply the creation of 
a risk of bodily harm, but that the defendant actually assaults 
a law enforcement officer.  Reckless endangerment is far 
different from assault, yet the District Court did not address 
the elements of an assault.  Under any of the potentially 
applicable standards of review, this constitutes reversible 
error. 
 
31 
 
 We also note that this case is factually distinguishable 
from most of the existing case law.  The Government and 
District Court both cited cases applying the assault 
enhancement where a defendant reached for a gun near a law 
enforcement official, but critically, the facts in such cases 
supported a finding of reasonable fear on the part of the 
official victim.  For instance, the District Court cited at length 
an unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion, United States v. 
Boysel, 208 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. 2000), which concerned a 
traffic stop wherein the defendant attempted to draw his gun 
near a police officer.  There, the Tenth Circuit noted that the 
defendant exited his vehicle in an aggressive manner, and the 
officer saw the defendant “‘very quickly reach[] behind the 
small of his back, with his palm facing out, not to pull up a T-
shirt, but as to go for a weapon.’”  Id. at *1.  The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that under such circumstances “a similarly 
situated reasonable person would have experienced 
apprehension,” and upheld the enhancement for assault.  Id. at 
*2.  Unlike the official in Boysel, Officer Onderko was 
unaware of any threat until it had passed. 
 
  Other cases cited by the District Court and 
Government are even further afield.  In United States v. Hill, 
583 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2009), an assault 
enhancement was upheld where the district court found that, 
“[t]he defendant was attempting to draw a weapon in order to 
discharge that weapon at the officer . . . The defendant 
stopping, turning towards the officer as he attempted to draw 
the weapon creates a clear inference that the defendant was 
attempting to use that weapon against the officer . . . .”   Such 
findings readily support an assault via attempted battery, 
where, unlike assault by menacing, the defendant intends to 
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physically harm another but fails in the effort.10
 
  Here, the 
District Court made no finding that Jones intended to harm 
the officers, and attempted battery therefore cannot apply.   
 The final case cited by the District Court, United 
States v. Powell, 6 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 1993), also dealt with a 
traffic stop where the defendant exited the car holding a gun.   
While that case did not focus on the assaultive conduct at 
issue, the Ninth Circuit did recount that the officer saw the 
firearm, “screamed, ‘Gun!’ and attacked [the defendant] in an 
effort to separate [the defendant] from the weapon.”  Id. at 
612.  Such facts indicate that the officer was aware of the 
threat and would reasonably have feared for his safety in such 
a situation.  Again, none of the cases cited above presents an 
analogous situation to this case, where the alleged assault 
victim was wholly unaware of the assaultive threat.  Under 
these rather unique circumstances, we hold that Officer 
Onderko was not assaulted, under § 3A1.2(c)(1), by Jones’s 
production of the gun.11
                                              
10 It is immaterial whether the intended victim is aware of an 
attempted battery, all that is required is an intent on the part 
of the perpetrator to cause bodily harm.  See Lee, 199 F.3d at 
18.   
 
  
11 The Government does not contend on appeal that Jones’s 
struggle with and flight from Officer Onderko constituted 
assault, nor that Officer Onderko’s leg injury was the result of 
assault.  Cf. United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 660-62 
(4th Cir. 2010) (finding completed battery in defendant’s 
struggle with police, constituting assault under § 
3A1.2(c)(1)). Accordingly, we do not address such 
arguments. 
33 
 
 
   We stress that our holding today is narrow and highly 
fact-specific, as indeed are many of the cases concerning an 
enhancement pursuant to § 3A1.2(c)(1).  We do not diminish 
the risks faced and fear experienced by law enforcement 
when confronted with a suspect attempting to withdraw a 
firearm.  Rather, our holding in this case simply reflects the 
common-sense conclusion that if an officer is unaware that a 
defendant is attempting to withdraw a gun, that officer has not 
been assaulted by this conduct under           § 3A1.2(c)(1).12
 
  
The District Court therefore erred in applying the 
enhancement and we will vacate the judgment of sentence 
and remand for re-sentencing. 
3.  Reasonableness of Guidelines and Defense 
Counsel’s Argument 
 
 Jones makes two final, somewhat related, arguments.  
His first contention is that the District Court improperly 
presumed that the guideline sentence range should apply.   
That is, a district court judge “may not presume that the 
Guidelines range is reasonable.  He must make an 
individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (citation omitted). 
 
 Jones’s argument is premised on a few statements 
made by the District Court at sentencing, which asked 
                                                                                                     
 
12 Again, as noted above, an attempted battery-type assault 
may be found if, unlike here, the record reflects that the 
defendant intended to cause bodily harm, regardless of 
whether the victim was aware of the attempt.  
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defense counsel to list “factors . . . that in your view support 
variance below the 120-month guideline range.”  (App. at 
322.)   Further, the District Court stated, “[i]n fashioning a 
sentence, I’m required to consider, in addition to the advisory 
guidelines range, the various factors set forth under 3553(a), 
and I’ve attempted to do that here.”  (App. 21-22.)  Jones 
argues that such statements demonstrate that the Court 
presumed the guidelines to be reasonable, absent some 
affirmative reason to vary from them. 
 We have repeatedly acknowledged that a district court, 
“may vary upward or downward from the range suggested by 
the Guidelines.”  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, we cannot conclude that in simply 
asking defense counsel to support his argument for a 
variance, a court is improperly presuming the guidelines to be 
reasonable.  Cf. Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350-51 
(2009) (finding reversible error where district judge stated 
that “the Guidelines are considered presumptively 
reasonable . . . .”).  Further, we find that the District Court 
thoughtfully performed the individualized analysis and 
consideration of § 3553(a) factors required at sentencing.  
(App. 325-30.)  The record thus confirms that the District 
Court at no point presumed the guidelines range to be 
reasonable, and we accordingly reject Jones’s argument on 
this ground. 
 
 Lastly, Jones contends that the District Court failed to 
address his argument that it did not promote respect for the 
law or provide just punishment to increase his sentence due to 
enhancements based on uncharged conduct.  He made a 
related argument that a high sentence sends the wrong 
message to the community because it signals to offenders that 
entering a plea (or cooperating with authorities generally) 
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does not lead to leniency. A sentencing “court must 
acknowledge and respond to any properly presented 
sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a 
factual basis.” United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 
329 (3d Cir.2007)).   
 
 It is well established that “conduct not formally 
charged or not an element of the offense can be considered at 
sentencing . . . .”  United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 863 
(3d Cir. 1997).  The Supreme Court has further held that “a 
jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing 
court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted 
charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Watts, 519 
U.S. 148, 157 (1997).  After reviewing the District Court’s 
reasons for its sentence, we conclude that it sufficiently 
considered and addressed Jones’s arguments.  
 
 Defense counsel initially stated that it was “wrong” to 
increase Jones’s sentence because of a finding, under the 
guidelines, that he had assaulted a police officer.  The Court 
responded, “You have a fundamental disagreement with the 
enhancements . . . under the guidelines, correct?” (App. 315.)  
To this defense counsel responded in part, “[o]ne of the 
biggest problems I have with the guidelines, is the 
government uses it to get around the Constitution.  The idea 
that if you think he committed an aggravated assault, charge 
him with that . . . .” (App. 315.)  
 
 Later, when defense counsel again reiterated his 
argument concerning the finding of uncharged offenses, the 
Court again stated, “[b]ut your point is, so I can make sure I 
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digest it and think about it appropriately.  Your point is, not 
only in this case, but in every case where an enhancement 
applies, isn’t that really your point?”  (App. 323.)  Defense 
counsel then argued in part, “I would say anybody who pleads 
guilty should not get the statutory maximum. That’s just 
fundamentally wrong.” (App. 323.) 
 
 In outlining its sentence, the District Court again 
addressed defense counsel’s argument about promoting 
respect for the law and providing just punishment.  The Court 
first recounted in detail Jones’s lengthy and violent criminal 
history before stating: 
 
 I’ve also considered the 
sentencing goal of promoting 
respect for the law and the  related 
goal of imposing a sentence that is 
sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to effectuate the 
sentencing goals. 
   
 I do not dispute that the 
guideline range here, driven by 
the enhancements, is significant.  
And clearly much more 
significant than it otherwise 
would have been without them.  
But the defendant finds himself in 
that range because of his conduct 
and no other reason. 
 
(App. 329.)  We conclude that the District Court’s thorough 
questioning and thoughtful discussion at sentencing refutes 
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any contention that it somehow ignored defense counsel’s 
argument.  cf. Begin, 696 F.3d at 411 (finding that the district 
court “asked no questions” concerning an argument of 
defense counsel, in holding that the court failed to address it).  
We, thus, reject Jones’s argument to the contrary. 
 
 
 
 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court’s judgment of sentence.  The 
sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing. 
